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IN SEARCH OF RACIAL JUSTICE: THE
ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Angela J. Davis*
This article examines the role of prosecutors in establishing and main
taining racial disparities in the criminal justice system, and examines efforts
of the Prosecution and Racial Justice Program of the Ve,:-a Institute of Jus
tice to enact reform within prosecutors' offices. After providing an overview
of the debate on causes of such racial disparities generally, the article ex
amines how seemingly race neutral charging and plea-bargaining decisions
by prosecutors can actually cause and perpetuate racial disparities. As a
model for reforming such practices, the article evaluates and critiques the
Prosecution and Racial Justice Program and makes recommendations for
how this program can be replicated across the country.
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INTRODUCTION
The racial disparities in our criminal justice system are extraordi
nary and well-documented. In 1995, nearly one in three African
American men between the ages of twenty. and twenty-nine were
under the supervision of the criminal justice system-either in jail,
prison, on probation, or on parole. 1 Today, one in every ten black
males in his thirties is in prison or jail on any given day. 2 Over 60% of
all prisoners in 2010 were Black or Latino. 3 The disparities exist at
every step of the criminal process, from arrest through sentencing.
Much has been written about why the American criminal justice
system is so fraught with racial disparity.4 Some point to discriminaI. MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK
AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER l (1995), avail
able at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_youngblack_5yrs1ater
.pdf.
2. Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
template/page.cfm?id=l22 (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
3. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010, at
26 (2011). Compare E. ANN CARSON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON
ERS IN 2011, at 9 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl l.pdf
(stating that in 2010, 468,528 state inmates were white, while 518,763 were black),
with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE WHITE POPULATION: 2010 3 (2011) (stating that in
2010, whites alone comprised 72.4% of the U.S. population), available at http://www
.census.gov/prod/cen20IO/briefs/c201Obr-05.pdf.
4. See generally MARC MAUER, RAcE TO INCARCERATE (2d ed. 2006) (discussing
the alarming rate that our prison population has grown in the last few decades and the
racial disproportionalities reflected in the increase); Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial
Disproportionality of United States' Prison Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL
OGY 1259 (1993) (exploring various explanations for the racial disproportionality in
cluding "racial discrimination in the criminal justice system" and "disproportionate
involvement in criminal activity"); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Dis
crimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction
of Fact and Perception 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1411 (2004) (extending a previous study

by Baldus that found gross racial inequities in the administration of the death penalty
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tory decision-making by criminal justice officials at each step of the
process while others suggest that disproportionate offending is the
cause. In fact, there are many complex reasons for this unfortunate
phenomenon. Criminal justice officials-including police officers,
prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials-make discretionary de
cisions that often have a racial impact. In addition, the socioeconomic
causes of crime disproportionately affect people of color. 5 The impact
of the War on Drugs cannot be overstated, and there are undoubtedly
many other factors that have contributed to the startling statistics and
overwhelming evidence of racial disparity. Not surprisingly, as the
causes of the racial disparities in our criminal justice system stem
from many sources, so must the solutions.
In this article, I focus on prosecutors. As the most powerful offi
cials in the criminal justice system, their discretionary decisions-es
pecially their charging and plea-bargaining decisions-play a very
significant role in creating and maintaining the racial disparities in the
criminal justice system. The good news is that prosecutors can, if they
wish, use that same power and discretion to help reduce these
disparities.
The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program of the Vera Institute
of Justice provides a model for reform that could help to eliminate
unwarranted racial disparities in the criminal justice system. In this
program, Vera Institute staff members work with prosecutors in se
lected offices to help them analyze the racial impact of their decisions
at various points of the process. According to the Program's website,
it "works collaboratively with its partners to analyze data about the
exercise and impacts of prosecutorial discretion; assists in developing
routine policies and practices that promote fairness, efficiency, and
professionalism in prosecution; and provides technical assistance to
help prosecutors implement those measures."6 Researchers from the
Vera Institute collect data at various decision points in prosecution
offices and use a methodology that seeks to determine whether and
how race neutral discretionary decisions have produced racial dispari-

in Georgia); Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites: Cocaine
Records Show Federal Officials Almost Solely Prosecute Nonwhites, L.A. TIMES,

May 21, 1995, at A l .
5. See generally Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action,
47 J. LEGAL Eouc. 452, 453 (1997) (describing how low socioeconomic status and
associated factors relating to poverty and social disadvantages to economic opportu
nity and attainment disproportionately affect people of color).
6. Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, VERA INsT. OF JusTICE, http://www
.vera.org/centers/prosecution-and-racial-justice-program (last visited June 3, 2013).
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ties. If racial disparities are identified, the chief prosecutor may then
take corrective action to eliminate them.
This article will discuss and evaluate the Prosecution and Racial
Justice Program. Might it serve as a model that could be duplicated in
prosecution offices across the country? To what extent might it effec
tively reduce racial disparities? How might the model be improved?
Part I will briefly discuss the racial disparity problem and some of its
causes. Part II will focus on the role of prosecutors and explain how
their seemingly race neutral charging and plea-bargaining decisions
can cause and perpetuate racial disparities. Part III will discuss the
Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, including its history and cur
rent projects. Part IV will analyze and critique the program by exam
ining its successes and challenges. Finally, Part V will provide
recommendations for successful duplication of the program in addi
tional prosecution offices.
I.
RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The statistics are startling. In 1954, there were about 100,000 Af
rican Americans in America's prisons and jails. 7 Today, there are al
most 900,000. 8 Current research suggests that one of every three
African American males born today can expect to go to prison at some
point in his lifetime, as can one of every six Latino males. 9 One of
every eighteen African American females and one of every forty-five
Hispanic females face a similar fate. 10 This data appears even starker
when compared to the statistics for their white counterparts: One in
seventeen White males and one in 111 White females can expect to
spend time in prison. I I
Scholars debate the reasons for the disparity, although most agree
that it is caused by a combination of factors, including disproportion
ate offending in certain categories of crime, discriminatory decision
making by criminal justice officials, certain criminal justice policies
and practices, and the War on Drugs. Most of the disagreement centers
around which of these factors plays the most significant role in caus
ing and perpetuating racial disparities. 12 In fact, it would be very diffi7. Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S,

88S (2011).
8. Id.
9. Id.

JO. Id.
11. Id.
12. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RAcE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998);
MAUER, supra note 4; Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, supra note 6.
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cult, if not impossible, to determine the precise extent to which each
of these factors contributes to the racial disparities in our criminal jus
tice system; they all play a role. Although this article focuses on the
role of the prosecutor, 13 disproportionate offending, racial profiling,
and the War on Drugs all contribute to the disparities.
A.

Disproportionate Offending

The proponents of the disproportionate offending theory claim
that African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately represented
in the criminal justice system because they commit a disproportionate
number of crimes. 14 One of the problems with relying on this theory is
that there is no accurate mechanism for measuring the rate of offend
ing. Although it would seem natural to rely on arrest statistics, they
are not a reliable measure of how many crimes are committed because
of the discretionary nature of the police function. A police officer may
arrest an individual if there is probable cause to believe that the indi
vidual committed a crime. 15 But even if there is probable cause, with
very few exceptions, a police officer is not required to make an ar
rest.16 In one neighborhood, a police officer may break up a neighbor
hood fight and negotiate a truce between the parties without making
an arrest. That same police officer might decide to arrest everyone
involved in a similar fight in another neighborhood, creating a record
of criminality. In addition, not all crimes are reported to the police.
Scholars have studied and evaluated arrest records and imprison
ment rates to try to determine the extent to which bias may play a role
in the criminal justice process. Alfred Blumstein's 1982 study com
pared African American arrest rates with African American imprison13. See infra Part III.
14. See generally WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JusncE
SYSTEM (1986); Heather McDonald, ls the Criminal Justice System Racist?, CITY J.,
Spring 2008, http://www.city-journal.org/2008/18_2_criminaljustice_system.htm1;
Jason Riley, Opinion, Race, Politics and the Zimmerman Trial, WALL ST. J., July 15,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB l 000l 424127887323394504578608 l 82550247
030.html.
15. See generally U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (upholding the constitution
ality of warrantless arrests as long as they are based on probable cause); 5 AM. JuR.
2D Arrest § 14 (2013) (illustrating that probable cause, as it has been incorporated
into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is a common sense determination based
on the reasonably cautious suspicion that an offense has been committed and that the
suspect committed it).
16. But see ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(l ) (2012) ("[A] peace officer, with or
without a warrant, shall arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe . . .
the person has committed domestic violence" (emphasis added)); CoLo. REv. STAT.
18-6-803.6(1) (2012); D.C. CoDE§ 16-103l(a) (2012); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 19.2-81.3
(2013) N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:25-12 (West 2005).
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ment rates in eleven categories of crime. 17 Blumstein concluded "that
in a nonbiased system, racial proportions in arrests would be mirrored
in racial proportions imprisoned." 18 He determined the percentage of
unexplained disproportionality for each category. Not surprisingly,
this percentage was low for homicide and aggravated assault (2.8%
and 5.2% respectively); 19 one would assume that for these serious of
fenses, police officers would more likely make an arrest, regardless of
the race of the defendant or victim. However for the other categories
of offenses, the percentage of unexplained disproportionality was rela
tively high-from 26% to 46%.20 The highest percentage-48.9%
was for drug offenses. 21
Assuming the accuracy and reliability of Blumstein's study, it
reveals a significant amount of unexplained disproportionality. This
unexplained disproportionality suggests that the incarceration of a
very large number of African Americans may be based, at least in
part, on racial bias at some point in the criminal justice process. 22 For
drug offenses, it would appear that almost half of African Americans
may have been incarcerated as a result of such bias. However, because
the study relies on arrest records, which do not accurately reflect rates
of offending, it cannot accurately reflect the extent to which racial bias
permeates the criminal justice system.
In sum, disproportionate offending among African Americans
and Latinos accounts for some of the racial disparities in the criminal
justice system, but it is difficult to quantify. For some offenses-like
drug offenses, for example-disproportionate offending does not ap
pear to be a significant factor. Since drug arrests and convictions ac
count for such a high percentage of individuals in prisons and jails,23
17. Alfred A. Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of United States' Prison
Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1275 (1982).
18. Id. at 1264.
19. Id. at 1274.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revis
ited, 64 U. Cow. L. REv. 743, 749 (1993) ("Racial discrimination is part of the

residual not accounted for.Such discrimination could account for a part, or all, of the
twenty percent not accounted for by the differential involvement in arrest--or perhaps
for even more than twenty percent).Examination of 1991 data shows that "... the
racial disproportionality situation for the crimes other than drugs is roughly compara
ble in 1991 to what it was in 1979." Id. at 754.
23. Drug Policy, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/tem
plate/page.cfm?id=I28 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) ("At the Federal level, prisoners
incarcerated on a drug charge comprise half of the prison population, while the num
ber of drug offenders in state prisons has increased thirteen-fold since 1980.").
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the role of disproportionate offending in the overall calculus of the
racial disparity problem is, at best, uncertain.
B.

Racial Profiling

Many scholars have written about the discriminatory effect of
discretionary decision-making by criminal justice officials, especially
at the arrest and prosecution stages of the process. 24 Police and prose
cutors exercise vast discretion in the performance of their duties and
responsibilities, and sometimes that discretion is exercised in ways
that result in different treatment of defendants and victims. Even if
police and prosecutors do not intend to discriminate against defen
dants because of their race, their race neutral decision-making some
times has a racial effect. Judicial decisions and certain criminal justice
policies also play a role.
Police officers engage in racial profiling when they suspect an
individual is engaging in criminal behavior because of that person's
race or ethnicity. The practice is based on racial stereotypes and
manifests itself in many different ways. The term "Driving While
Black" or "DWB" is used to describe the phenomenon of pretextual
traffic stops in which police officers stop African American drivers on
the pretext of giving them a traffic ticket so that they may question
them, ask for consent to search, and otherwise investigate them for
crimes for which they have no basis to suspect them. 25 With all forms
of racial profiling, police officers stop and question and/or search indi
viduals solely because of their race or ethnicity when they have
24. See generally PAUL BUTLER, LET's GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JusncE
(2009) (presenting various proposals to combat discriminatory practices and mass in
carceration in the criminal justice system); MILTON HEUMANN & LANCE CAsSAK,
GooD CoP, BAD Cop: RACIAL PROFILING AND COMPETING V1Ews OF JusTICE IN
AMERICA (3d ed. 2007) (exploring the impact of racial profiling on racial and ethnic
minorities); DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CAN
NOT WORK (2003) (discussing how racial profiling is unjust and ineffective in
preventing crime or apprehending criminals); Mark D. Rosenbaum & Daniel P.
Tojaki, Healing the Blind Goddess: Race and Criminal Justice, 98 M1cH. L. REv.
I 941 (2000) (discussing some of the many overt abuses of power by law enforcement
officials that have affected racial minorities); Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony
Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507 (1976) (focusing on
the powerful role that the prosecutor plays in the enforcement of laws); Developments
in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, IOI HARV. L. REv. 1472 (1988) (review
ing the impact that criminal justice officials can have at all stages of the criminal
charging and sentencing process).
25. See generally David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and The Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) (discussing the many
instances where African Americans who have been subjected to pretextual traffic
stops and the deleterious effects that "DWB" stops have on African American
communities).
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neither reasonable suspicion26 nor probable cause27 to believe they are
engaged in criminal activity.
Racial profiling was so rampant in New York City that a class
action lawsuit was brought against the city. In Floyd v. New York City,
the plaintiffs challenged the police department's stop and frisk policy
as being in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.28 During the trial, the plaintiffs
presented overwhelming evidence that police officers were stopping
individuals based on their race or ethnicity with neither probable cause
nor reasonable suspicion. 29 In an extraordinary opinion issued on Au
gust 12, 2013, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ruled for the plaintiffs, find
ing that New York City's stop and frisk policy violated the plaintiffs'
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 30 Judge Scheindlin found
that senior officials in the City and New York Police Department were
"deliberately indifferent" to unconstitutional stop and frisks and that
these practices were sufficiently widespread to have the "force of
law."31 She further found that the police department had a policy of
indirect racial profiling based on criminal suspect data and that senior
officials in the City and police department were deliberately indiffer
ent to the intentionally discriminatory practices at the officer and man
agerial levels.32 The city of New York has appealed the decision.33
Although racial profiling has been formally condemned by legis
lators,34 police chiefs,35 and even the President of the United States,36
26. See 5 AM. JuR.2D.§ 14, supra note 15.
27. See generally Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Con
sidering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60
Omo ST. L.J. 99 (1999) (arguing against the "broken-windows" theory, where the
appearance of a neighborhood is said to justifiably arouse "reasonable suspicion" in
the minds of law enforcement officers).
28. 739 F. Supp. 2d 376, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
29. Id. at 378-79, 383-85.See also Floyd v.City of New York, 283 F.R.D.153,
170, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[T]he frequency of alleged injuries ...here creates a
likelihood of future injury sufficient to address any standing concerns ... As [plain
tiffs] argue, these claims raise 'central questions of fact and law that, when answered,
will resolve all class members' Monell claims against the City."').
30. Floyd v.City of New York, No. 08 Civ.1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at *75
(S.D.N.Y.Aug.12, 2013).
31. Id. at *70.
32. Id. at *72.
33. See Benjamin Weiser, City Asks Coun to Vacate Rulings on Policing Tactic,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov.10, 2013, at A31.
34. See Racial Profiling Prevention Act, H.R. 838, I 13th Cong.(2013); see also
Ending Racial Profiling in America Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., I 12th Cong.(2012) (recounting

the instances of racial profiling in immigration and terrorism policy in the 21st
Century).
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police officers continue to engage in the practice. 37 The Supreme
Court has held that police officers may stop a driver as long as he has
probable cause to believe the individual has committed a traffic of
fense, even if it is a pretextual traffic stop. 38 The Court made it clear
that any claim of racial discrimination must be based on the Equal
Protection Clause and requires a showing that the officer engaged in
intentional discrimination. 39 Proving intentional race-based discrimi
nation is difficult, and often police officers do not discriminate inten
tionally. Racial profiling may be based on unconscious racism40 or
implicit bias, for which there is no legal remedy.41
In addition to the practice of racial profiling, police officers con
tribute to racial disparities when they engage in more heavy-handed
police practices in neighborhoods of color than in white neighbor
hoods.42 When police maintain a presence in neighborhoods of color
and are absent from white neighborhoods, it is no surprise that they
will arrest African Americans and Latinos while declining to arrest
their similarly situated white counterparts. The failure to arrest whites
who engage in criminal behavior contributes to racial disparity as
much as the blatant practice of racial profiling.
35. See PORTLAND PoLICE BUREAU, PLAN TO ADDRESS RACIAL PROFILING 3 (2009)
(discussing Chief Roseanne M. Sizer's plan to research and curtail racial profiling in
Portland, Oregon); cf Matthew Kauffman, Police Chief Pleads for Clarity in Racial
Profiling Law, HARTFORD CouRANT, Mar. 12, 2012, http://courantblogs.com/investi
gative-reporting/police-chief-pleads-for-clarity-in-racial-profiling-law/ (showing that
local Hartford, CT, police chiefs support the collecting of data for profiling statistics).
36. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Obama Wades into a Volatile Racial Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/23race.html?_r=O
(drawing on the unfounded arrest of Prof. Henry Louis Gates to highlight President
Obama's opposition to racial profiling during his time as an Illinois Senator).
37. See Fernanda Santos, Judge Finds Violation of Rights by Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2013, at A 14 (discussing the ruling by an Arizona federal district judge that
Sheriff Joe Arpaio and his deputies violated the rights of Latinos by targeting them
during raids and traffic stops in Maricopa County, AZ).
38. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).
39. See id. at 813.
40. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (explaining that
subconscious biases, while not overt, nonetheless inform racially disproportionate
criminal justice practices).
41. See Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role
of the Prosecutor, 39 CoLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 202, 205-07 (2007).
42. See generally Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. C1v1L LIBERTIES UNION, http://www
.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Oct. 30, 2013); George L. Kelling
& James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLAN
nc, Mar. 1, 1982, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-win
dows/304465/.

830

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

C.

[Vol. 16:821

The War on Drugs

The term "War on Drugs" was first used widely in 1973 when
President Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") to announce "an all-out global war on the drug menace."43
During the 1980s, it escalated drastically with the passage of numer
ous draconian drug laws carrying long prison terms and mandatory
minimum sentences on both the federal and state levels.44 States re
ceived federal funding to increase arrests and prosecutions,45 and not
surprisingly, a disproportionate number of the arrestees were African
American and Latino. In the mid-1980s, drug arrests went from
581,000 in 1980 to 1,663,000 in 2009.46 The number of incarcerated
drug offenders rose from about 41,000 persons in 1980 to nearly
500,000 by 2003.47 The racial disparities steadily increased as well.
African Americans constituted 21% of drug arrests in 1980 and that
number rose to 36% in 1992.48 African Americans only constitute
about 13% of the population.49
Although the laws appeared to be race neutral, they were en
forced in ways that produced racial disparities. Data on regular drug
users collected by the Department of Health and Human Services has
consistently shown over the years that African Americans use drugs at
the same rate as whites. 50 In light of that fact, one would not expect
racial disparities in drug arrests, prosecutions or convictions. Data col
lected in 1993 revealed that although African Americans only com
prised 13% of all monthly drug users, they were 35% of arrests for
drug possession and 55% of all drug convictions. 51 Although statistics
on drug distribution are not as readily available, the existing research
suggests that individuals who purchase drugs are much more likely to
43. Claire Suddath, The War on Drugs, TIME, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.time.com/
time/world/article/0,8599, 1887 488,00.html (exploring the history of the War on Drugs
as it reflects our relations with Mexico and South America).
44. See generally Clarence Lusane, In Perpetual Motion: The Continuing Signifi
cance of Race and America's Drug Crisis, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 95-99, 101-02
(1994) (discussing the implementation of mandatory minimums in the context of the
war on drugs).
45. See id. at 99-100 (discussing the war on drugs' disparate impact on minority
arrests and criminal prosecution).
46. Mauer, supra note 7, at 94S.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. USA: People Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 25, 2013, I :52 PM),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/OOOOO.html.
50. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAM
ICS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 7 (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
doc/dp_raceanddrugs.pdf.
51. MAUER & HULING, supra note I, at 12.
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purchase them from someone of their own race,52 suggesting that there
must be a significant number of whites involved in drug distribution.
Congress passed cocaine laws that particularly exacerbated the
racial disparities in the criminal justice system. 53 The penalties for
possession and distribution of cocaine were vastly different, depend
ing on whether it was in powder or crack form. Crack cocaine offenses
were penalized at 100 times the rate of powder cocaine offenses. The
penalty for distribution of 500 grams of powder cocaine was 5
mandatory minimum years in prison while distribution of only 5
grams of crack cocaine carried the same penalty. 54 Since African
Americans were much more likely to be arrested and prosecuted for
crack cocaine offenses, this 100: 1 disparity greatly contributed to the
racial disparities in the prosecution of drug offenses. In 2010, Con
gress reduced the disparity to 18: 1. 55
Other laws that contribute to racial disparity include laws that
enhanced the penalty for drug offenses committed near schools-usu
ally 500 to 1,000 feet. 56 These laws appear to be race neutral and seem
to promote the goal of protecting children from drug dealers. How
ever, because a disproportionate number of people of color live in ur
ban areas and near schools, the laws have a racially disparate effect. 57
Disproportionate offending in certain categories of crimes (de
spite the difficulty predicting its impact), racial profiling, the War on
Drugs, and certain sentencing laws and policies all contribute to racial
disparity in the criminal justice system. The role that prosecutors play
in the equation is unique because of their extraordinary power and
discretion. The impact of their discretion, power, and decision-making
cannot be overstated.

52. See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR
QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 21-22
(2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_25year
quagmire.pdf (citing K. JACK RILEY, NAT'L INST. OF JusTICE, CRACK, PowDER Co
CAINE, AND HEROIN: DRUG PURCHASE AND UsE PATTERNS IN Srx CITIES I (1997)).
53. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986) (prior to 2010 amendment).
54. Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities, supra note 7, at 94S.
55. See id. at 95S; see also Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 110-220, § 2,
124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
56. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2.
57. See id.
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II.
THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR

Prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice
system. They make the decisions that control the system, and they
exercise almost boundless discretion in making those decisions. 58
Many argue that police officers are the most important officials in
their role as the gatekeepers who bring individuals into the system. 59
There is no doubt that police officers exercise broad discretion in de
ciding whether to stop and/or arrest individuals for criminal behavior.
However, police officers only have the power to bring individuals to
the courthouse door. It is the prosecutors whose decisions keep them
there and firmly entrench them in the system-decisions that have
life-changing consequences.
The most important prosecutorial decisions are the charging and
plea bargaining decisions. 60 Prosecutors control and almost predeter
mine the outcome of criminal cases through these two critical deci
sions. They decide whether to charge an individual with a crime and
what the charge or charges should be, and they enjoy vast discretion in
making this decision. Even if a prosecutor believes she can prove a
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, she is not required to
charge that individual. 61 If she does decide to charge, she often has
discretion to charge either a misdemeanor or felony. For example, if
an individual is arrested with a large quantity of cocaine, the police
officer might recommend that the person be charged with Possession
with Intent to Distribute Cocaine-a felony that carries a mandatory
minimum sentence. The prosecutor has a number of choices. She may
decide to charge the person with the felony, but she also has the dis
cretion to charge him with simple possession-a misdemeanor that
may result in a probationary sentence with fewer collateral conse
quences. The prosecutor may also choose not to charge the person at
58. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 5 (2007); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary
System, 1992 BYU L. REv. 669, 671-72 (1992) (acknowledging the immense power
that a prosecutor wields in the criminal justice process); Thomas & Fitch, supra note
24, at 509 (focusing on the powerful role that the prosecutor plays in the enforcement
of laws).
59. See, e.g., Larry J. Siegel, Police and Law Enforcement, in CRIMINOLOGY
498-533 (7th ed. 2000) ("Police are the gatekeepers to the criminal justice process
and they use their power of arrest to initiate the criminal justice process.").
60. See DAVIS, supra note 58, at 22, 43.
61. See Melilli, supra note 58, at 673 ("A decision not to prosecute, or to dismiss a
pending prosecution, may be made even in the face of sufficient evidence for
conviction.").
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all. The charging decision is totally within the discretion of the
prosecutor.
Prosecutors enjoy the same discretion in the plea-bargaining pro
cess. They are not required to offer the defendant a plea to a lesser
offense, but if they do, they decide what that offer will be. 62 Certainly
a defendant may agree to plead guilty to a lesser offense if the prose
cutor dismisses all other offenses, but the decision is up to the prose
cutor. And with the existence of so many offenses that carry
mandatory minimum sentences, the plea bargaining power has become
even more important. Since going to trial always carries the risk of
conviction, the only way a defendant can be assured that he will not be
convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence is to
plead guilty to a lesser offense. Ninety-five percent of all criminal
cases are resolved by way of a plea.63 Prosecutors' control of the
charging and plea-bargaining decisions almost permits them to prede
termine the outcome of most criminal cases.
Charging and plea-bargaining decisions have a tremendous im
pact on racial disparities in the criminal justice system. 64 If a prosecu
tor charges an African American with a crime but chooses not to
charge his similarly situated white counterpart,65 or chooses to charge
the white counterpart with a less serious offense, she will create an
unwarranted disparity. But the problem is a complex one. A prosecu
tor is rarely presented with two cases-one white defendant, one
black-with exactly the same circumstances (same prior record, same
facts, etc.) where she consciously chooses to treat the black defendant
more harshly. She may unconsciously empathize with a white defen
dant and give him preferable treatment, or she may offer a white de
fendant better treatment for legitimate reasons that produce a racial
impact.
Consider the case of a white defendant who is arrested for selling
cocaine in his dorm room. The arresting officer recommends that he
62. See

LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE

1-2 (2011).
63. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485-86 (2010)).
64. See BESIK! KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, Do RACE AND
ETHNICITY MATTER IN PROSECUTION? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 13-14
(2012), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race
and-ethnicity-in-prosecution-first-edition.pdf; Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's
D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393 (2009)
(discussing the role of the prosecutor in the Jena Six cases in Jena, Lousiana in 2007).
65. A "similarly situated" white counterpart would be someone who has committed
the same crime, with the same prior record and who has other similar characteristics
relevant to the charging decision.
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be charged with distribution of cocaine-a felony offense with a five
year mandatory minimum sentence. The defendant's parents hire an
attorney who tells the prosecutor that the defendant is suffering from a
debilitating drug addiction and was selling drugs only to support his
own addiction. The attorney indicates that the defendant has been ac
cepted to a six-month program at a residential drug treatment facility.
He also informs the prosecutor that the defendant is an honor student
who planned to apply to law school, that he has never been arrested in
his life, and that a felony conviction would ruin his career and his life.
A prosecutor might legitimately offer such a defendant a plea to a
misdemeanor offense, or even dismiss the case all together. One
could see how a prosecutor might empathize with such a defendant,
subconsciously seeing himself and perhaps remembering his own
"youthful indiscretions."
That same prosecutor might handle the case of a similarly situ
ated black defendant quite differently. Consider the black defendant
arrested for selling cocaine on the street comer in his neighborhood.
The arresting office recommends the same charge-distribution of co
caine. This defendant is poor and represented by an overworked public
defender. The public defender discovers that his client is addicted to
cocaine and was selling the drug only to support his habit. The family
cannot afford to pay for residential treatment and there are no free
programs available. The defendant does not have a prior criminal re
cord but is a high school dropout with no employment prospects. The
public defender asks the prosecutor to consider dismissing the case,
and the prosecutor declines.
The prosecutor's decisions in these cases would produce a racial
disparity, but were her decisions unfair or unjustified? Shouldn't a
prosecutor pursue an outcome that results in an alternative to incarcer
ation, thereby saving scarce government resources, especially if she
does not believe that the defendant poses a danger to the community?
Is it the prosecutor's fault that the black defendant could not afford to
pay for a drug program and was neither employed nor in school? Yet
the black defendant did not appear to be any more deserving of a
prison term than the white defendant. The prosecutor may have had an
unconscious bias towards the white defendant and against the black
defendant, but how could that be proven? And even if it were true,
would it matter, considering all the other factors?
If prosecutors charge African American and Latino defendants
with crimes while neglecting to charge their similarly situated white
counterparts, they may b e engaging in race-based selective prosecu-
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tion. Race-based selective prosecution violates the Constitution,66 but
proving it is difficult. As with racial profiling, the victim of selective
prosecution must prove that the prosecutor intended to discriminate
against him because of his race.67 The Court practically closed the
door on all claims of race-based selective prosecution when it decided
United States v. Armstrong.68 In Armstrong, the Court held that in
order to get discovery to prove selective prosecution, the defendant
must show that similarly situated whites could have been charged, but
were not69-an impossible showing for almost anyone. 70
The Supreme Court has consistently required proof of intentional
discrimination in criminal cases, and the amount and type of proof
necessary have made successful challenges extremely difficult, if not
impossible. In McCleskey v. Kemp,11 Mr. McCleskey presented a so
phisticated study of how the death penalty was implemented in the
state of Georgia. The study, conducted by Professors David Baldus,
Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (known as "the Baldus
Study") produced startling racial disparities in the implementation of
the death penalty and concluded that black defendants who kill whites
were more likely to receive a death sentence.72 The Court accepted the
validity of the study and its findings, but nonetheless declined to re
verse Mr. McCleskey's death sentence. 73 Because the study did not
prove that the prosecutors in Mr. McCleskey's case intended to dis
criminate against him because of his race, the Court rejected his claim.
The difficulty of proving intentional discrimination does not pose
the most difficult challenge, since intentional discrimination is rarely
the cause of racial disparity in today's criminal justice system. Most
racial disparities are caused and/or exacerbated by prosecutors' race
neutral decisions which may be influenced by unconscious racism.
66. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) ("[l]t was not stated that the
[selective prosecution claim) was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.").
67. See Ah Sin v. Whitman, 198 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1905) (ruling that in order to
establish a discriminatory effect, the plaintiff must show that similarly situated indi
viduals of a different race were not prosecuted).
68. 517 U.S. 456, 465-66 (1996) (citing Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 507-08).
69. See id.
70. See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 275, 276, 307 (2007) (discussing the lack of en
forcement of prosecutorial misconduct policies and the insurmountable burden that
citizens face in showing selective prosecution).
71. 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 297 ("Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insuffi
cient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case
acted with discriminatory purpose.").
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These race neutral decisions, even though unintentional, may have a
racial impact.
Whether or not prosecutors intentionally or unconsciously dis
criminate against defendants of color in the charging and plea-bargain
ing processes, their decisions-even the race-neutral ones-may
cause or exacerbate racial disparities. Their tremendous power and
discretion is often exercised in ways that produce unintended and un
desirable consequences. However, that same power and discretion can
be used to remedy the problem. The next section will examine one
possible solution.
III.
THE PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE PROGRAM

In 1998 in an article entitled "Prosecution and Race: The Power
and Privilege of Discretion," I proposed "the use of racial impact stud
ies in prosecution offices to advance the responsible, nondiscrimina
tory exercise of prosecutorial discretion."74 The racial impact studies
would involve the collection and publication of data on the race of the
defendant and the victim in each case for each category of offense and
the prosecutorial action taken at each stage of the criminal process.
The data would be analyzed to determine if race appeared to be related
to the prosecutorial decisions. These studies would possibly reveal the
racially discriminatory impact of race-neutral discretionary decisions
and policies and help prosecutors formulate policies and guidelines to
reduce racial disparities. Finally, I recommended the publication of the
studies to inform the general public about prosecutorial practices and
enable them to hold elected prosecutors accountable.
The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program of the Vera Institute
of Justice is an innovative program that involves the collection and
analysis of data in prosecution offices to determine the impact of dis
cretionary decisions. According to the Program's website:
Vera's Prosecution and Racial Justice Program (PRJ) enhances
prosecutorial accountability and performance through partnerships
with prosecutors' offices nationwide. PRJ works collaboratively
with its partners to analyze data about the exercise and impacts of
prosecutorial discretion; assists in developing routine policies and
practices that promote fairness, efficiency and professionalism in
prosecution; and provides technical assistance to help prosecutors
implement those measures. By collaborating with prosecutors, ana
lyzing data, and devising solutions, PRJ works alongside prosecu74. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
67 foRDHAM L. REv. 13, 18 (1998).
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tors to improve their performance and related criminal justice
outcomes. 75

The PRJ staff developed a series of performance indicators that
focus on four significant points in the prosecutorial process that in
volve the exercise of discretion: initial case screening, charging, plea
offers, and final disposition. 76 The program's methodology allowed
them to discover whether similarly situated defendants were being
treated differently at each of these steps in the process.
A.

History

The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program ("PRJ") was estab
lished in 2005 with the goal of helping prosecutors "manage the exer
cise of discretion within their offices in a manner that reduces the risk
of racial disparity in the decision-making process."77 To be effective,
the program required chief prosecutors to grant Vera Institute staff
broad access to their offices in order to track decision-making at key
discretion points with the goal of identifying patterns of disparity.
PRJ's first director was Wayne McKenzie, a prosecutor in the Kings
County District Attorney's Office in Brooklyn, New York. Mr. Mc
Kenzie took a leave of absence from his office to direct the program.
His status as a prosecutor gave the program credibility with the partic
ipating prosecutors and staff and helped to secure their cooperation.
The first chief prosecutors to volunteer for the Program were Pe
ter Gilchrist of Charlotte, North Carolina, Paul Morrison of Johnson
County, Kansas,78 and Michael McCann of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
The Vera Institute staff reached out to these prosecutors because they
enjoyed an excellent reputation in the prosecution community and in
their jurisdictions. Other factors that made these prosecutors suitable
for the project included the location of their offices and the
demographics of their communities.79
75. Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, supra note 6.
76. WAYNE McKENZIE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL
JUSTICE: USING DATA TO ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 2 (2009),
available at https://files.nyu.edu/dac229/public/2009_03_06_PRJ_8page_FINAL.pdf.
77. Wayne McKenzie, Briefing Memorandum for Advisory Board Meeting in
Charlotte (Dec. 1, 2005), in DAVIS, supra note 59, at 192.
78. Paul Morrison withdrew before beginning the project because he left the chief
prosecutor position to run for Attorney General of the state. See infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
79. See Charlotte, Nonh Carolina, State & County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS Bu
REAU (June 27, 2013, 2: 10 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37/3712000
.html (providing the following figures: White alone, percent 2010: 50.0%, Black or
African American alone, percent 2010: 35.0%, Hispanic or Latino, percent 2010:
I 3.1%); Johnson County, Kansas, State & County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
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Findings in Mecklenburg County and Milwaukee

Mecklenburg County District Attorney's Office, Charlotte, North
Carolina

The Vera Institute staff began their work in the Mecklenburg
County prosecutor's office in Charlotte, North Carolina. The PRJ staff
worked hard to establish a good working relationship with the prose
cutors and support staff. They had to convince the Charlotte staff that
they were not there to place blame or label them as "racists" but to
help them enforce the law effectively and fairly. Key to the program's
success in Charlotte was the fact that PRJ was directed by a former
prosecutor. Another factor that helped secure buy-in was the fact that
the data collection and management system that Vera implemented not
only helped discover possible bias, but it also helped them manage
their caseloads.
The findings in Charlotte were quite revealing. The supervising
prosecutors were surprised to discover that the office was prosecuting
almost 97% of all drug cases-a very high percentage considering the
fact that the office was prosecuting only 70% of all cases combined. 80
Another surprising finding was that African American women were
treated more harshly than members of any other group- I 00% of the
drug cases involving African American women were prosecuted. 81
The Assistant District Attorneys had been adopting the police officer's
charging recommendations in 98.9% of the cases, and 70% of the de
fendants charged were people of color. 82
PJR's findings prompted the District Attorney, Peter Gilchrist, to
take action. He appointed different people to the supervisory positions
and implemented policies that required the Assistant District Attor
neys to screen the cases more carefully. These changes resulted in a
reduction of the percentage of drug cases charged to 88% and a de(June 27, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/20/20091.html (pro
viding the following figures: White alone, percent 2012: 87.9, Black or African Amer
ican alone, percent 2012: 4.8%, Hispanic or Latino, percent 2012: 7.4%); Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, State & County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 27, 2013, 2:19
PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/5553000.html (providing the follow
ing figures: White alone, percent 2010: 44.8%, Black or African American alone,
percent 2010: 40.0%, Hispanic or Latino, percent 2010: 17.3%).
80. McKENZIE ET AL., supra note 77, at 7.
81. Id.
82. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the Sub
comm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judici
ary, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (testimony of Wayne S. McKenzie, Director of the
Prosecution & Racial Justice Program, Vera Institute of Justice), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/McKenzie091029.pdf.
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crease in the decision to prosecute cases involving African American
females. 83 Mr. Gilchrist met with community members and informed
them of ·his office's participation in PRJ and their findings and re
ceived positive feedback. 84 Peter Gilchrist retired effective December
31, 2010. His successor, R. Andrew Murray, did.not continue the rela
tionship with PRJ, so the program is no longer in effect at that office.
2.

Milwaukee, County District Attorney's Office, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin

Michael McCann had been the District Attorney in Milwaukee
for 37 years when he decided that his office would partner with PRJ.
Following his retirement in 2006, his successor, John Chisholm, con
tinued with the program. His office has implemented the most suc
cessful and long-standing model of the program to date. Mr. Chisholm
continues to work with the program and its current director, Whitney
Tymas, who is also a former prosecutor. PRJ has completed statistical
studies in the Milwaukee office in four categories of crimes: Posses
sion of Drug Paraphernalia, Prostitution, Resisting or Obstructing an
Officer, and Domestic Violence.
a.

Possession of Drug Paraphernalia

When PRJ staff members first began their work in Milwaukee in
2006, they examined the initial case screening decisions for the nine
most frequently occurring crime categories. In six of those nine cate
gories, they found that prosecutions against people of color were de
clined at a slightly higher percentage than whites. 85 However, the
results were reversed when it came to public order and drug offenses.
Specifically, they found that in 41% of the arrests of whites for Pos
session of Drug Paraphernalia, the prosecutors declined to prosecute
compared to only 27% of people of color arrested for the same of
fense. 86 The supervising prosecutors met to discuss the possible rea
sons for this disparity. They discovered that inexperienced
misdemeanor prosecutors were making most of these decisions. 87
They also discovered that a significant number of the drug parapher
nalia cases in the city of Milwaukee, where the majority of African
Americans in the greater community reside, involved possession of
crack pipes, while the paraphernalia in the suburban parts of the
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7-8.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id.
87. McKENZIE ET AL., supra note 77, at 7.
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county involved other types of paraphernalia. 88 One suggestion was
that the junior prosecutors viewed crack cocaine as a more serious
drug and therefore prosecuted the possession of crack pipes more
aggressively.89
John Chisholm responded to these findings by implementing new
charging policies. He first explained to his staff that possession of
crack cocaine paraphernalia was probably an indication of a drug ad
diction. He then directed his staff to decline prosecution in these cases
and refer the arrestees to drug treatment. Any prosecutor who wanted
to charge an individual with this offense was required to justify the
decision and get approval from a supervisor.90 The new policy reme
died the racial disparity and resulted in an overall reduction in the
prosecution of these cases.91 Mr. Chisholm hosted a number of com
munity meetings about his office's engagement with PRJ, the results
of the findings, and his new policies, and the community response was
very positive.92
b.

Prostitution

The PRJ staff examined prostitution cases referred to the Mil
waukee County District Attorney's Office between January 2009 and
June 2010. Their initial examination of these cases showed that black
defendants were much more likely to be charged than white defen
dants.93 They decided to examine the cases more closely by collecting
information about the defendants' prior record and probation status
and by examining the initial screening decision and whether the defen
dants were offered deferred prosecution.94 Their findings demon
strated that black defendants were more likely to be charged, but were
also more likely to be offered deferred prosecution.95 An analysis of
cases involving female defendants revealed that black female defen
dants were more likely to be charged than white female defendants. 96
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.

91. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, supra note 83, at 8.

92. Id.
93. VERA INST.

OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR CASE P ROCESSING ANALYSIS

1 (2011) (on file with author).
94. "Deferred Prosecution" is a diversion program in which the defendant is re
quired to fulfill certain conditions over a period of time (such as a two-year alcohol
treatment program for a DUI). If the conditions are met, the case is dismissed. If the
conditions are not met, the District Attorney's office proceeds with the prosecution.
95. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 1, 7.
96. Id. at I.
- PRosTITUTION
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191 cases with a top charge of prostitution were referred to the
District Attorney's Office.97 The majority of defendants were black
(61%), female (65%), in custody (75%), referred by the Milwaukee
Police Department (94%), and had a prior record (64%).98 The PRJ
staff examined the race and gender of the defendants and found that
black defendants had the highest charge rate (89%) compared to a
charge i;ate of 86% for white defendants.99 Most of the defendants
were black females (42%), followed by white females (20%), black
males (19%), and white males (14%).100 The charge issuance rate for
black females was 91%, 87% for white females, 83% for black males,
and 85% for white males.101
The PRJ staff also examined the gender and level of experience
of the prosecutors making the charging decisions. There were 34 pros
ecutors reviewing prostitution cases during this time period. 102 The
average number of years of experience was eight years, and the me
dian was four years. 103 47% of the cases were reviewed by men and
43% were reviewed by women. Women were more likely to bring
prostitution charges than men - 99% of the cases vs. 81%.104
When examining the existence of charging differences by race,
the PRJ staff took into account a number of factors, including the de
fendant's gender and age, the number of charges, the defendant's cus
tody status, the prosecutor's gender, the referral agency (Milwaukee
Police Department or other agency), the defendant's prior overall re
cord and prior prostitution record, and the defendant's probation sta
tus.105 Taking all of these factors into account, the charging rate was
only 2% higher for black defendants, a difference that might be ex
plained by factors not considered. 106 The PRJ staff did a separate, sim
ilar analysis focusing on female defendants only. This analysis

97. Id. ''Top charge" refers to the most serious offense charged.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. The odds of case issuance were initially 9% higher for black defendants but
decreased to 2% when prior record and probation status were taken into account,
suggesting that much of the 9% difference was attributable to those two factors. Id. It
should be noted, however, that these findings are not statistically significant and there
fore cannot be generalized to other jurisdictions.
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revealed that black female defendants were more likely to be charged
than white defendants. 107
The examination of whether a defendant was offered deferred
prosecution revealed opposite results. The PRJ staff members con
trolled for the same factors considered for the analysis of the charging
decision. They found that the odds of receiving deferred prosecution
were 10% higher for black defendants. 108
c.

Resisting or Obstructing an Officer

A total of 1,283 cases with a top charge of Resisting or Ob
structing an Officer (hereinafter "RO") were referred to the Mil
waukee County District Attorney's Office between January 2009 and
June 2010. 56% of all the cases were charged with no difference be
tween black and white defendants (55% of each racial group was
charged).109 Most of the defendants charged were black (70% ), male
(79% ), and in custody (80% of blacks and 66% of whites). 110
The PRJ staff members decided to sample 200 cases (100 white
defendants and 100 black defendants) and include information about
the defendants' prior record and probation status.111 Sixty-two percent
of the cases in the sample were charged with R0. 112 Most of them
were male (72% of whites, 81 % of blacks), in custody (68% of whites,
73% of blacks), and had a prior record (57% of whites, 64% of
blacks).113 Among defendants with a prior record, a similar percentage
of white and black defendants were charged.114
d.

Domestic Violence

The findings from the Domestic Violence study were notable in
that they included statistics on the race of the victim and the race of
the defendant. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and Prostitution
might be characterized as victimless crimes, and because the victims
in Resisting or Obstructing an Officer charges are all police officers,
the impact of the race of the victim on the charging decision in those
cases would likely be insignificant. However, domestic violence cases
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id. at 9.
109. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR CASE PROCESSING ANALYSIS
- RESISTING OR OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER l (Sept. 13, 2011) (on file with author).
I 10. Id.
11 l. Id. at 2 ( oversampling white defendants because a smaller proportion of the RO
defendant population was white).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3.
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provided an opportunity to examine whether interracial cases were
treated differently from intraracial cases, and if so, how.
There were 10,455 domestic violence cases referred to the Dis
trict Attorney's Office between January 2009 and June 2010. 115 Most
of these defendants were black (74%), male (84%), and were referred
by the Milwaukee Police Department (81%).116 The majority of vic
tims were black (69%) and female (83%).117 Ninety-one percent of the
cases were intraracial (the defendant and victim were of the same
race).118 Most cases involved a black defendant and victim (67%), fol
lowed by a white defendant and victim (24%), a black defendant and a
white victim (7%) and a white defendant and a black victim (1%).119
The PRJ staff considered a number of factors in determining
charging outcomes by the defendant's race, the victim's race, and the
defendant's race and victim's race combined. These factors included:
the defendant's gender, the victim's gender, the number of charges,
the seriousness of the charge, the defendant's custody status, offense
enhancers, and the referral agency (police department or other
agency).120 When controlling for these factors, they found almost no
difference in the charging decision based on the defendant's race.121
However, they found that the odds of charging in cases involving
black victims were 16% lower than in cases involving white vic
tims.122 There was an even more significant disparity in cases involv
ing black defendants and white victims - the odds were 34% higher
that charges would be brought in these cases than in cases with a white
defendant and white victim.123
To address the disparities in the prosecution of domestic violence
cases evident from PRJ's findings, Mr. Chisholm invited PRJ staff
members to participate in a series of meetings between members of his
office, the law enforcement community, the domestic violence advo
cacy community, the probation department, and others. After the
meetings were concluded, the PRJ staff recommended additional train
ing of prosecutors, investigators and representatives of the domestic
violence advocacy community. The training took place in October
115.

VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR CASE PROCESSING ANALYSIS
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.

2 (201 l) (on file with author).
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2012 and focused on providing effective strategies for working with
victims from diverse races and cultures and on how to approach cases
in which victims remain with their assailants - an occurrence that had
been identified as associated with race, ethnicity, and socio-economic
status in some instances. 124 Sarah M. Buel, a well-known domestic
violence activist, facilitated the training. 125
The training received positive feedback, so Mr. Chisholm asked
PRJ to assist in arranging additional training with the goal of increas
ing cultural competency when handling the cases in which the re
search identified disparity-domestic violence and prostitution
cases. 126 Mr. Chisholm is planning community brainstorming meet
ings to promote community engagement and accountability. 127 The
PRJ staff will share the findings from the research and inform commu
nity stakeholders about the work. The PRJ staff also provided Mr.
Chisholm's office with recommendations about how to improve the
PROTECT system, (the acronym for the statewide data management
system). These recommendations focused on changes that would facil
itate future social science research. 128
B.

New Partners

Cyrus Vance, Jr., the District Attorney for the New York County
District Attorney's Office, agreed to participate in the Prosecution and
Racial Justice Program, and the PRJ staff began working in this office
in January 2012. The funding for the work at this site (in the borough
of Manhattan) was secured through a grant with the National Institute
of Justice. The findings will be published when completed. PRJ will
also begin studies at the Lancaster County Attorney's Office in Lin
coln, Nebraska (headed by County Attorney Joe Kelly) and the San
Francisco District Attorney's Office (under the leadership of District
Attorney George Gascon) in early 2014.

124. Email from Whitney Tymas, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice Program,
to Angela Davis (July 7, 2013, 3:45 PM) (on file with author).
125. Id.
126. Email from Whitney Tymas, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice Program,
to Angela Davis (June 10, 2013, 1:09 PM) (on file with author).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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IV.
AS A MODEL FOR REFORM

A.

Advantages

PRJ has great potential as a model for prosecutors who want to
improve the quality of justice by working to eliminate the unwarranted
racial disparities in our criminal justice system. As the most powerful
officials in the criminal justice system, prosecutors have the discretion
and power to implement policies in their offices that can have a signif
icant and positive impact on this problem. The same lack of trans
parency that makes it difficult for their constituents to hold them
accountable for the decisions they make can also provide the political
cover to allow them to make significant changes-particularly at the
charging stage of the process-that can help to reduce unwarranted
racial disparities. PRJ provides a model for how this can be done.
The PRJ model has many advantages over other approaches.
First, it is evidence-based. The collection of data at key decision
points in the process allows prosecutors to know whether their race
neutral decisions have a racial effect. PRJ's methodology is based on
regression analysis, which permits prosecutors to consider numerous
relevant variables and the possible effect that each may have on out
comes. For example, the case analyses done in the Milwaukee District
Attorney's Office demonstrated that the consideration of defendants'
prior criminal record was a key factor in the charging decision that
had a significant impact on racial disparities for certain offenses. 129 A
prosecutor armed with this knowledge is in a much better position to
make a decision about whether the disparities are unfair and unwar
ranted and what policies she might implement to reduce the
disparities.
A second benefit of the PRJ model is that it eliminates the need
for blame. One of the biggest challenges to eliminating the racial dis
parity caused by criminal justice decision-makers is what to do when
it appears that it is caused by racial bias-implicit or otherwise. No
one wants to be called a racist, and when the bias is unconscious,
"racist" may not be a fair label. At any rate, blaming individuals for
unconscious bias is neither necessary nor advisable, as such blaming
does nothing to solve the problem. Certainly, appropriate education
and training about implicit bias would benefit any prosecution of
fice. 130 But the PRJ model allows a prosecutor to implement policies
129. See McKENZIE ET AL., supra note 77, at 6.
130. See generally Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L.
REv. 1124, 1169-77 (2012) ( examining how intervention strategies using training and
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and change practices that may be causing disparities without pointing
fingers or punishing. A chief prosecutor who decides to implement the
model in her office could achieve buy-in and support from staff by
making make it clear from the outset that the purpose of the study is
not to place blame, but to discover whether there are unwarranted bi
ases that may be corrected by a change in practices or policies. The
chief prosecutor establishes the practices and policies of the office, so
if any assistant prosecutor's implementation of those policies causes
unwarranted racial disparity, it is ultimately the responsibility of the
chief prosecutor. District Attorneys Gilchrist and Chisholm were able
to successfully implement changes in policies without blaming or pun
ishing anyone on their staffs.
A third advantage of the PRJ model is that it can be implemented
without legislation or rule making. The legislative process is not only
time-consuming, but prosecutors and legislators are almost always
concerned about being seen as "soft on crime." A law that would man
date that prosecutors implement the PRJ model may be difficult to
pass, as it may be seen as diverting resources from law enforcement.
A chief prosecutor with the will and resources may proceed with the
PRJ model without legislation or even without asking or informing
anyone. Of course, the better practice would be for the chief prosecu
tor to inform and engage her constituents. District Attorneys Gilchrist
and Chisholm informed criminal justice officials and community
members about PRJ and were successful in getting buy-in and support
for the project.
B.

Challenges

The model, in its current form, does have its challenges. One of
its advantages-the fact that it can be implemented without legisla
tion-may also be seen as a disadvantage. Without some enforcement
mechanism, the program is dependent on the will, interest, and priori
ties of individual prosecutors. Few prosecutors view the elimination of
racial disparities in the criminal justice system as their responsibility.
Even those interested and concerned about the problem may be too
occupied with what they view as their primary obligation-enforcing
the laws and keeping their communities safe. Most prosecutors are
extremely busy with the day-to-day work of bringing charges (includ
ing grand jury proceedings), litigating motions, interviewing and pre
paring witnesses, trying cases, and handling all of their other
education can counter implicit biases in the courtroom by focusing on the judge and
jury).

2013]

IN SEARCH OF RACIAL JUSTICE

847

responsibilities. The idea of adding a major project to an already
overburdened office probably would not be attractive to most
prosecutors.
If a prosecutor decides to go forward with the project, a lack of
transparency may be a challenge to its success. One of the troubling
characteristics of prosecution offices is the lack of transparency. Pros
ecutors are not required to share information about their internal
charging and plea-bargaining decisions, and the Supreme Court has
protected this lack of transparency. 131 Without transparency, there is
no accountability. If a prosecutor implements the PRJ model and dis
covers unwarranted disparities, her constituents would not be able to
hold her accountable for correcting them if the findings are not made
public. Publication of the findings was not a condition of participation
for PRJ's first partners. Peter Gilchrist and Michael McCann (and sub
sequently John Chisholm) chose to communicate with their constitu
ents about the program, and John Chisholm even released the findings
from the program's work in 2009-2011. However, they were not re
quired to do so. 132
Even when a chief prosecutor decides to implement the model, its
sustainability may be in jeopardy once that prosecutor leaves office.
Shortly after agreeing to participate in PRJ in 2005, Paul Morrison
announced that he was switching from the Republican to the Demo
cratic Party and running for Attorney General of the state. With his
political campaign and focus on a statewide office, Mr. Morrison did
not have time to participate in PRJ. He ultimately won the election and
began his tenure as Attorney General in January 2007. 133
Bonnie Dumanis, the District Attorney of San Diego County,
agreed to participate in PRJ soon after Paul Morrison withdrew. The
San Diego County office worked with PRJ for approximately eighteen
months before withdrawing from the program for similar reasons. Ms.
Dumanis also ran a political campaign that left little time for directing
and supervising the work of the program.
I3 I. See DAVIS, supra note 59; Abby L. Dennis, Reining in the Minister of Justice:
Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DuKE L.J. 131 (2007); Teah
R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279 (2002).
132. PRJ's current Director, Whitney Tymas, implemented a Memorandum of Un
derstanding with the New York County District Attorney's Office that included publi
cation of the findings. Similar memoranda are expected with the Lincoln, Nebraska,
and San Francisco, California, partners.
133. Monica Davey, In Kansas, Top Official Announces his Resignation, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. I5, 2007, at A 15 (reporting that Mr. Morrison took over for former Attor
ney General Phil Kline in early 2007 and announced his resignation in December
2007 because of a scandal involving an extramarital affair with a former employee
who filed an EEOC claim alleging sexual harassment).
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When Peter Gilchrist left office, his successor chose not to
continue the program. The Milwaukee District Attorney had a differ
ent experience. Michael McCann's successor, John Chisholm, carried
on the work very successfully.
Another challenge to the success of the program is the availabil
ity of resources. Few prosecutors have excess funds in their budgets.
The Vera Institute obviously cannot support every prosecutor inter
ested in implementing the PRJ model. Prosecutors would have to se
cure funding to hire experts to conduct the studies in their offices. 134
V.
RECOMMENDATIO NS

The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program has great potential
for reducing racial disparities in our criminal justice system, but there
are challenges that must be overcome to encourage its adoption by
other prosecution offices. This section recommends possible solutions
to some of these challenges.

A.

Information Campaign in the Prosecution Community

There should be a n information campaign in the prosecution
community to inform and educate prosecutors about the PRJ model
and why it is important to the prosecution function. Part of the cam
paign would involve providing information about the racial disparity
problem and its many disparate causes, including the racial impact of
race neutral decision-making by prosecutors and other criminal justice
officials. The emphasis should be on the important role that prosecu
tors can play by making simple policy changes that would not threaten
public safety.
The best ambassadors for the information campaign would be the
prosecutors who have implemented the model in their offices. The
three well-known, well-respected prosecutors who participated in the
program would be in the best position to convince other prosecutors of
the importance and validity of the program. They would have the most
credibility with other prosecutors, and their experiences (the successes
and challenges) would be most valuable to prosecutors, whether they
are interested or skeptical. The participating prosecutors might speak
at conferences and meetings of prosecution organizations such as the
134. Although it would be difficult to predict costs because so many variables are
involved and they differ from location to location, the estimated cost of the research
component of the eighteen-month Manhattan project was $390,000. Email from
Whitney Tymas, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, to Angela Davis
(Sept. 27, 2013, 12:00 PM) (on file with author).

2013]

IN SEARCH OF RACIAL JUSTICE

849

National District Attorneys Association, the American Prosecutors
Research Institute, the National Association of Assistant United States
Attorneys, the National Black Prosecutors Association, and similar
organizations.
B.

Partnerships with Academic Institutions

Prosecutors interested in duplicating the PRJ model in their of
fices will undoubtedly need funding. Although they could request
funding from their state legislatures as part of their budget requests,
with the budget challenges in most states, this probably would not be a
reliable source of funding. Prosecutors might also seek grant funding
from foundations and from the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice
Assistance. 135
Interested prosecutors might also try to partner with an academic
institution. PRJ is the type of project that would be of interest to aca
demics in the criminology and statistics departments of many universi
ties. Law professors might also be interested in participating in and
supporting the project. A cross-disciplinary partnership would be
ideal. Since academics routinely seek grant funding for worthwhile
projects, such a partnership would relieve the prosecution office of the
burden of funding and implementing the project. The academic insti
tution would provide the funding and expertise.
C.

Transparency and Accountability

Prosecution offices that decide to implement the model should
inform their constituents, seek their advice, and publish the findings of
the project. Prosecutors who decide to participate probably will re
present communities concerned about racial disparity issues. Prosecu
tors should communicate with their constituents about all issues of
concern, and should share any relevant information that is not confi
dential. This transparency is essential to holding prosecutors accounta
ble to the people they serve. They should not be concerned about
revealing findings that show racial disparity. If the disparity is unwar
ranted, the prosecutor should be prepared to change their practices
and/or policies to eliminate it. If the disparity is justifiable, the prose
cutors should explain the reasons for the disparity to her constituents.
Publishing the findings and communicating about the project with
135. PRJ received funding from the National Institute of Justice for their partnership
with the New York County District Attorney's Office. Besiki Kutateladze,

Prosecutorial discretion project in New York County,

VERA INST. OF JusTICE BLOG

(Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.vera.org/blog/prosecutorial-discretion-project-new-york
county.
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community members would have the added benefit of building and
improving the prosecutor's relationship with her constituents.
D.

Support from the Bar

The purpose of the public information campaigns is to encourage
prosecution offices to adopt and implement the PRJ model. However,
prosecutors are not the only lawyers with a vested interest in fairness
in the criminal justice system. All lawyers - even those who do not
have a criminal practice - should be invested in assuring fairness in
the criminal justice system. For that reason, local and national bar as
sociations should also sponsor educational programs about racial dis
parity and the PRJ model as a possible solution. These bar
associations should encourage their prosecutor members to implement
the model, and they should provide support when possible.
The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section has
sponsored a number of projects with the goal of ensuring racial fair
ness in the criminal justice system. 136 It might feature a program on
PRJ and even seek a resolution from the ABA House of Delegates
endorsing the model and encouraging prosecutors to implement it,
when appropriate. Similar support from the National Bar Association,
the Hispanic National Bar Association, and state and local bar associa
tions should also be sought.
CONCLUSION

Racial disparity in the criminal justice system is a complex prob
lem with many disparate causes. Its elimination will require change
within and outside of the criminal justice system. The socio-economic
causes of crime may never be totally eliminated. However, individuals
in the criminal justice system can have an impact on the problem.
Prosecutors are particularly suited to help eliminate racial disparities
because of their power and discretion.
Prosecutors must not only be willing to replicate the Prosecution
and Racial Justice Program, they must be willing to change their prac
tices and policies in ways that will have a real impact. Sometimes
these changes will involve abandoning traditional methods of deci
sion-making to achieve fairness. For example, even though consider136. The most recent project is the ABA's Racial Justice Improvement Project. See
Racial Justice Improvement Project, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://racialjus
ticeproject.weebly.com/ (last visited June 5, 2013); see also Cynthia Jones, Con
fronting Race in the Criminal Justice System: The ABA 's Racial Justice Improvement
Project, 27 CRIMINAL JUSTICE I (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/confronting_race_cj_system.pdf.
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ing a defendant's prior record as a factor in the decision to charge is
appropriate, if the existence of prior records is the main reason why
otherwise similarly situated black defendants are being charged while
whites are not, prosecutors should consider abandoning that factor.
Public safety must remain the priority, but there are many defendants
arrested for nonviolent offenses with criminal records of nonviolent
offenses. Even if prosecutors focused on nonviolent offenses alone
and abandoned or reduced reliance on traditional charging considera
tions in those cases, they could make a difference.
The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program is not a panacea, but
it is one remedy that can make a difference. However, it can only
work with the participation of chief prosecutors who are willing to
make racial justice a priority. The prosecutors who have worked with
PRJ have demonstrated that commitment. They took a chance that
produced positive results in their offices and serve as examples for
other prosecutors who seek to fulfill their duty to assure a fair and
effective criminal justice system.

